Evolution, knowledge and Christian faith: Gerd Theissen and the cred ibility of theology In this article the way in which Theissen uses the evolutionary paradigm as a com prehensive framework for interpreting not only central themes in theology but also the credibility of theology as such, is analysed from an epistemological point of view. Theissen's overall choice for critical ration alism is critized as an epistemological blurring of paradigms, and thus of models of rationality, and typified as a quest for realism and explanatory progress in theology instead. In interpreting the evolutionary paradigm for theology, Theissen does, however, open up exciting possibilities for retaining the scientific and cognitive status of theological statements.
AN EV O LU TIO N A RY IN TER PR ETA TIO N OF C H R ISTIA N FAITH
Gerd Theissen's recent Biblical faith : An evolutionary approach (1984) is an excellent example of the fact that the credibility of theology is invariably linked to the problem of the credibility of C hristian faith as such. To be able to fully appreciate his im portant perspective on this problem , I think this book should be read against the background of his form er On having a critical faith (1979) . From both these books emerge what can surely be seen as the most basic problem s for any critical contem porary theologian:
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• why h e/she continues to identify consciously and openly w ith the Christian tradition; • the problem of truth in theology, w hich as such poses the unavoid able epistem ological quest for rationality in theological thought.
The basic theses of both Theissen's books can be summed up as follows;
• There are good reasons for being a Christian and for constructing Christian theology in a scientifically credible way.
• This does not, however, mean that C hristianity can be defended in its traditional form.
• If good theology, and therefore what 1 would prefer to call the quest for epistem ological credibility has to be retained, C hristian faith will have and should be able to change.
Theissen (1979) explicitly wants to point out that C hristian faith can stand up to relativist, em piricist and ideological critique, and what is even more im portant: the C hristian theologian can offer unconditional personal com m itm ent and renounce any absolutist claims for theolog ical statem ents at the same time. This intention of his will have far-reaching consequences w hen in Biblical fa ith : An evolutionary a p proach he specifically follows Karl Popper and epistem ologically opts for a critical rationalist paradigm of thought. Already in the first of the two books (1979; 2ff) Theissen -to my mind correctly -states that 'truth' in theology could never be a lim ited num ber of established proposi tions but instead functions as a norm ative idea that constantly puts all our theological statem ents to the test. W hat Theissen really m eans by this, will of course have to be assessed very carefully.
Theissen rightly warns that theologians should avoid the intellectual coma (1979; 6) of positivism in theology (cf Van H uyssteen 1986; 23ff) at all cost. This m eans that traditional C hristian religious statem ents should be reformulated in such a way that they could be shown to be expressions of possible religious experience. Here Theissen is very m uch to the point; relating theological statem ents, as the intellectual reflection on religious statem ents, to religious experience as such, could be the only way of countering the suspicion that religious statem ents may be projective, illusionary and thus anti-realistic by nature (cf Van H uyssteen 1986; 169ff) . This is probably the m ost im portant reason why I would typify Theissen's work as a quest for realism in theology, although he, unfortunately, never id entifies this all-im portant problem from a contem porary philosophy of science point of view. My main objections to the way in w hich he eventually opts for the evolutionary paradigm will be directly related to what I would prefer to call an epistem ological blurring of paradigm s, and thus of m odels of rational ity, in T h eissen 's otherw ise excellent work.
I would therefore like to show that it is not so much Theissen's underlying realist position that 1 personally find problem atical, but much rather the epistem ological model of thought and the type of assum ptions he works from to arrive at this position.
A central them e of both books is therefore to be found in the profound statem ent that an ontological gulf (1979; 12) permeates reality. For Gerd Theissen this is the basic (epistem ological) reason why the objects of religious experience transcend the ordinary everyday world. He consequently speaks of a 'm ore than life', a 'search for a reality which has yet to be disclosed ' (1979: 13) , and an 'adaptation to a reality w hich extends beyond hum anity ' (1984: 15) . From a philosophy of science point of view this obviously reveals a theoretical com m itm ent to some form of realism in theology. But in neither of the two books this basic assum ption is ever put to discussion. W hat could have becom e the most exciting and creative basis of Theissen's argum ent, for this very reason unfortunately becom es the most problematical.
1 can otherw ise fully identify with Theissen's basic and central question: Will religion eventually and irreversably be dissolved in the process of secularization, or does it in fact preserve an attitude to reality w hich will never be out of date (1979: 20) ? O bviously religion is tied up with the quest for m eaning in human life, but the central question rem ains: Do religious experiences indeed have a real content (1979: 26) , or as I would prefer to phrase it, do religious experiences and our theological statem ents about these experiences really refer?
Theissen in fact specifically raises this question (although to my mind he never answers it in a satisfactory way): Are there any reasons why religious conceptions should be grounded in an objective reality or are they all based on dogm atic confessions of faith (1979: 28f)? To this question he provides a very am biguous answer, w hich I think is directly related to a very problem atical reception of the Popperian model of thought, or what 1 earlier called a 'blurring' of paradigm s, in his own theorizing:
• On the one hand Theissen (1979: 23) clearly states that it is as im possible to show some of our contem poraries that religion in volves a fundam ental relationship to reality (and is not just a reaction to frustration or an unconscious piece of self-realization) as it is to show colours to a blind man.
• O n the other hand Theissen (1979: 29) claim s that we m ust look for an 'em pirical' basis for religious statem ents, and then on the basis of the fact that statem ents can only be tested if the reality to w hich they relate can be compared with the reality that we experience.
I fully sym pathise with the fact that in the long run religious experi ences should be seen as the only real origin of statem ents of faith and thus also of theological statem ents. But if this em pirical basis should imply a correspondence theory of truth w here the reality of religious experiences should be 'tested' against the reality to which these experiences relate, this of course becom es highly problem atical. T h eis sen (1979: 32) explicitly states:
The anthropom orphic reality which religious statem ents seek to express must be compared with the reality w hich we experience; this is the only way of testing its truth-content.
This not only im plies an epistem ological retreat to a positivist paradigm as far as a model of rationality for theology goes, but also goes directly against T heissen's own Popperian or critical rationalist idea of a norm ative truth. In theology any access to the reality to which believers relate in terms of a corresponding theory of truth is obviously im possible. But quite apart from the problem s positivism has created and still creates for theology, access to the reality to which believers relate, is possible only through the m etaphorical concepts of the Christian faith. And this becom es epistem ologically credible only w ithin a critical realist model of rationality. As I have tried to point out earlier, it is only w ithin this type of rationality model that the Christian theologian can offer unconditional personal com m itm ent and at the same tim e critically renounce all absolutist claims for theological knowledge. And this, I think, is precisely what Theissen wants to achieve.
A gainst this background I find it trem endously im portant that Theissen can explicitly state that religious conceptions have a sym bolic character (1979: 30) , and that in these conceptions 'th e fam iliar is projected on to the unfam iliar, and earthly im ages serve as m etaphors for "d iv in e m y steries'". My critical question here would be -especially when he eventually uses m etaphors from the theory of evolution -w hether Theissen really follows through the creative possibilities of this line of though and w hether he indeed grasps the full epistem ological and m ethodological im plications of this im plied theological real ism for the scientific credibility of theology?
The constructive choice in T heissen's thought for a form of realism in theology seem s very obvious w hen he asks: 'Are there structural affinities betw een non-hum an and human reality? Only if this is so, can there be a justifiable foundation for the anthropom orphism of religious im agery ' (1979: 32) . W hat really is m eant by 'structural affinity' will eventually be all-im portant for an evaluation of Theissen's choice for an evolutionary explanation of the Christian faith. It will obviously also be basic to any credible form of realism in theology, and will therefore have to be defined carefully.
Furtherm ore, what is very im portant for understanding Theissen's version of realism in theology, is that he can -and correctly so -state: 'W hatever we may understand by "G od ", he cannot be conceived of w ithout his being related to the whole universe, the m ost distant galaxies and the tiniest atomic elem ents ' (1979: 33) . And to this he adds the profound statem ent: 'Religion seeks to relate man to the whole of reality, not only to our fellowman, even if our neighbour may concern us more than anyone else. ' Theissen eventually chooses a com prehensive concept which covers both relationships betw een human beings and experiences of the holy other than in human relationships, and this he calls the experience of resonance (1979: 33; 1984: 19f) . This concept im plies not only structural affinities w hich are objectively present, but also their subjective effects: on the one hand, man shows his longing for resonance in reality. O n the other, he is powerfully affected by the structures in reality w hich are capable of resonance and adopts a responsive attitude towards them (1979: 33) .
Furthermore, since religious experiences are concerned w ith m ean ing, every experience of resonance stands out from the background of possible absurdity. For Theissen (1979 : 34) religion therefore is the sensitivity towards the resonance and absurdity of reality. And the credibility of religion would therefore depend on w hether there is an experience of the holy which is capable of moving life to the very depths and which at the same time can w ithstand critical exam ination.
After having discussed the am azing structural affinity betw een the constructs of science and what he calls 'objective reality ' (1979: 35f) , Theissen proceeds and develops his argument for what would eventu ally becom e (1984) an evolutionary interpretation of the essentials of the C hristian faith, by specifically stating; It could well be that the sim ilarity betw een nature and the structures created by our understanding requires the hypothesis of an objective spirit, a creative understanding or an intrinsic purpose w ithin the universe (1979: 35).
W hy Theissen specifically chooses the theory of evolution to try to deal w ith the credibility of Christian belief from the perspective of scientific thought, is never really made quite clear -except for the fact that the evolutionary paradigm is regarded as the m ost com prehensive scien tific framework that we can use in our time (Theissen 1984: xi) . His choice for the theory of evolution m ight perhaps best be explained by the follow ing statem ent:
It is possible to interpret the whole of evolution from aqueous m atter to the most complicated organism s as a heightening of life. In that case, m an's own life appears as the echo of an all em bracing tendency of life towards som ething more than life (Theissen 1979: 48) .
This quotation highlights the -to my m ind -two most im portant factors in Theissen's theological model, and also the basic reasons for his choice for the paradigm of evolution as an explanatory model for C hristian faith:
• his decision for a very definite form of realism in theology;
• his basic and ultimate decision for Christianity.
An evaluation of Theissen's exciting thought will therefore not only have to deal with his interpretative adaptation of evolutionary catego ries for theological thought, but also very specifically with the realist im plications of his basic argument and w ith the difficult question as to w hether his ultim ate com m itm ent to the C hristian faith is indeed com patable w ith his apparent choice for what he calls the 'evolutionary epistem ology' of Karl Popper's critical rationalism (Theissen 1984: xii).
THE TH EO RY O F EV O LU TIO N , FAITH AND KN O W LEDGE
In his recent book Theissen (1984) very clearly outlines his objectives: he wants to analyse and interpret Biblical faith w ith the help of evolutionary categories, seeing the theory of evolution as one of the m ost fascinating constructions of human reason w hich as such can generate an explanation of the framework w hich determ ines our life (1984: xi) .
Theissen therefore clearly handles the theory of evolution as an explanatory structure by w hich our knowledge can -as he specifically states (1984: xi) -adapt to reality. O bviously the theory of evolution itself has undergone evolution, can never be absolutised and as such has lim ited validity. But what is even more im portant is that Theissen (1984: xii) also explicitly rejects any form of biologism , i e, a naive transference of biology to human culture. In fact he interprets human history (including the history of Biblical faith) by m eans of a theory w hich analogously derives from biology and therefore does not claim an unbroken continuity betw een biological evolution and human history.
W hen Theissen eventually analyses and interprets Biblical history, he therefore never in a naively optim istic way sees straight lines of developm ent from the beginnings of Israel to prim itive C hristianity. O n the contrary, he consistently stresses discontinuity, the break in history, the new beginning: thus m onotheism in Israel (1984: 43ff) and Jesus of Nazareth, his proclam ation and m inistry, are not interpreted as the result of an 'evolution', understood as continuous developm ent (1984: 8 3 -1 2 8 ). Both of these are instead to be viewed as revolutions in the history of religion.
In outlining the analogies betw een biological and cultural evolution, Theissen uses the theory of evolution as an explanatory model for dealing w ith the complex and problem atical relationship betw een faith and know ledge. Eventually he tries to dem onstrate that w ith the aid of evolutionary categories like adaptation, selection and m utation, faith and knowledge can be shown to have much more in comm on than the so-called 'contradictions ' (1984: 3 -8 ) betw een scientific thought and religious faith would seem to suggest.
The fact that Theissen contrasts scientific thought and faith in the first chapter of his book, seem s to be rather obvious and unproblem atical. That he does, how ever, try to pinpoint the know ledge-faith prob lem by identifying three contradictions betw een scientific thought and faith I find highly problematical. I think that not so much the so-called contradictions betw een scientific thought and faith should be dis cussed, but much rather -and much more appropriate -the problem atical relationship betw een scientific thought, on the one hand, and theological reflection on faith, on the other.
Later in this book (1984: 37) -unfortunately after having discussed the three contradictions betw een scientific thought and faith -Theissen does in fact refine this problem in a way and suggests a parallel developm ent or co-evolution of knowledge and faith, or science and theology. He in fact typifies science and theology both as thoughtthrough and therefore system atized forms of belief. It is indeed not so much the relationship betw een science and faith, but instead the relationship betw een science and theology -as critical reflection on faith -w hich is the real problem here.
I also think that this refined and more accurate distinction would have rather profoundly influenced the way Theissen identifies 'contra dictions' betw een science and faith. Religious faith would only be in opposition to science w ithin a positivist paradigm , and of course also in a critical rationalist one. W ithin a critical rationalist model of rational ity, faith could of course be m eaningful and even true (cf Van Huyssteen 1986: 44) . Faith, and statem ents about faith could, how ever, never form part of the so-called scientific context of justification and therefore of the scienfitic process itself. The fact that Theissen consciously chooses for a Popperian and thus critical rationalist epistem ology will obviously be of direct relevance for the way in which he deals w ith the relationship betw een religious faith and knowledge. W hether Theissen in fact rem ains true to the Popperian line of thought, rem ains to be seen.
I am convinced that in the end T heissen's choice for the theory of evolution as an attempt to integrate human knowledge, is not so much motivated by the critical rationalist ideas of verisim ilitude, corrobora tion and falsification, but by the realist assum ptions and eventual exciting realist im plications of this model for theology. From a philos ophy of science point of view it would therefore have been more consistent as well as more fruitful to opt for a realist position in scien tific as well as theological thought. This would have enabled him to retain his argum ents for the credibility of theological thought, but then w ith a much more convincing and stronger epistem ological basis. knowledge now makes it necessary to take a closer look at the way he not only id entifies three contradictions betw een scientific thought and faith, but also at the way each of these contradictions are in the end 'revitalized' by Theissen. The three contradictions and T h eissen 's revised and improved interpretations of these 'standard problem s' are:
3.1 Scien tific statem ents are hypothetical w hile statem ents of faith are apodeictic (1984: 4) -over against this Theissen (1984: 18) states:
H ypothetical scien tific thought and apodeictic faith are d ifferent form s of adapting to an unknow n reality
The way in w hich Theissen's choice for a critical rationalist model of rationality determ ines both these form ulations, have already been briefly pointed out. From a realist position, w here the real problem has been identified as the problem atical relationship betw een scien tific thought and theological thought, it would suffice to say: Both scientific and theological thought are provisional and therefore each in its own way hypothetical and as such forms of 'adapting' to different d im en sions of an unknow n reality. Furthermore, this does not in any way contradict the 'apodeictic' character of living faith and the ultim ate religious com m itm ent that grounds this faith. 1 am therefore convinced that the character of the act of faith and the ultimate religious com m it m ent that always precedes it, should in no way be confused w ith the nature of statem ents about faith, which in their own way are as hypothetical as any other scientific statements. W hat 1 therefore find lacking in Theissen's otherw ise excellent work, is a clear distinction betw een the role and functions of an ultim ate religious com m itm ent and that of a theoretical com m itm ent to a specific paradigm of thought. This distinction is necessary if he -w ith good reasons -still prefers to opt for the explanatory possibilities of the evolutionary model so that he can move away from the often tacit lim itations of positivism w hich still haunt the rationality model of critical rationalism , to the much more creative epistem ological p ossi b ilities of current scientific realism.
W hat makes this so im portant is that Theissen, although apparently following Popper in his choice for an evolutionary epistem ology, does not seem to realize the im plications of this choice for the credibility of theological thought: From a critical rationalist view point not only faith and an ultim ate religious com m itm ent are bracketed out of the scientific 'level' of the so-called context of justification, but also the analogous interpretation of cultural evolution as a higher form of biological evolution are -vk^hen it comes to the history of C hristian faith -in no way open to falsification in the true sense of the word. The acceptance of an evolutionary epistem ology and certain basic concepts from critical rationalism in this way therefore leads to the 'blurring' of paradigms of which I spoke earlier. The answer to this problem is, I think, to be found in the transcending of this thought model and in an exploration of the very obvious quest for realism w hich so clearly typifies T heissen's work.
S cien tific thought is su bject to falsification; faith goes against the facts (Theissen 1984: 4)
-in contrast to this Theissen (1984: 18) claims;
Science controlled by falsification and faith w hich goes against the facts are d ifferent form s of coping w ith the pressure of selection exercised by reality I think this statem ent of T heissen's can only be apphed to religious faith as a lived deed (fides qua), but never to theological reflection and therefore to theological statem ents about faith as such. O f course, in most of the (natural) sciences progress is m onitored in terms of success and therefore in terms of the elim ination of errors. In theology this process of justifiability by experim ental or em pirical falsification is obviously not possible. I am, however, convinced that w ithin a critical realist paradigm , theological theories can be shown to be problem solving and progressive, but then in terms of herm eneutical, philoso phy of science, historical, literary and linguistic criteria. In this case both the constructs of science and theology give us our only access to the different dom ains of reality we are groping for and as such are always provisional and hypothetical. The real problem there fore is not so m uch falsification by facts or going against facts, but:
• the fact that scientific and theological thought can both only function w ithin the framework of a very definite theoretical com m itm ent to specific models of rationality, and • that theological thought is apparently always preceded by a very definite ultim ate (religious) com m itm ent.
3.3 Scien tific thought delights in dissension; faith is based on consensus (Theissen 1984: 4 -8) -this 'contradiction' is now rephrased by Theissen (1984: 30ff) to read:
Science w hich delights in dissent and faith w hich depends on consensus are d ifferent form s of the openness of our spiritual life to m utations Again, this m ight be true, but the problem surrounding the credibility of theological thought from a philosophy of science point of view , has still not been addressed at all. Indeed faith as such, as lived by believers in the church, tends towards consensus. Theissen is also correct in pointing out that the early church developed three social controls to protect this consensus: the canon, the regula fid ei as a confession to what was seen as the essence of C hristian faith, and the episcopacy. This indeed in a sense obligates the church and its believers to tradition (Theissen 1984 (Theissen : 33), to consensus (1984 and to authority (1984: 45) .
N one of these, however, can be said to be true of an epistem ologically (and thus scientifically) credible, constructive theology w here the w eight of rational argument is as im portant as in any scientific process of theorizing. Furthermore, the classical text of the C hristian tradition not so much controls consensus in an authoritarian way but should herm eneutically function w ithin a critical realist problem -solving model w here text and tradition are to be constantly reinterpreted (cf Van H uyssteen 1987) . As far as church office and the authority that goes with it are concerned: This to my mind may function in a m eaningful way in the church itself, but is as such totally irrelevant for a construc tive theology.
1 therefore think that Theissen not only obscures the very valid distinction betw een faith and statem ents about faith, but also that betw een com m unity faith (1984: 4) and theology as such. This ob v i ously can leave no room for a trans-confessional, much broader con ceptualized constructive theology but can only lead to a very restricted form of 'church' or 'confessional theology'.
To therefore contrast the originality of science with com m unity faith's fidelity to tradition, can w ithin this context never be accepted. In theological thought it can be its originality and creative construction (w ithin a valid and thought-through realist paradigm ), that forms the essence of theological theorizing (Van Huyssteen 1986: 206ff) . W hat is m s 44/1 n m ) more, Thom as S Kuhn (1970a: 180f; 1970b: 253) convincingly showed that also scientific com m unities -in periods of 'normal science' -display an enorm ous fidelity to tradition. Th eissen 's argument can now be summed up as follows:
• Just as in biological evolution life has developed through m utation and selection towards constantly new forms of adaptation to reality, so too culture has developed different forms of adapting to the basic conditions of reality: and of these science, art and religion are the m ost im portant. And only w hen these com plem ent one another do they do justice to the richness of reality. Each of these should in fact be seen as an independent way of com ing to grips w ith reality.
• In this process of com ing to grips with reality, forms can be established w hich are analogous to those in the processes of m uta tion and selection. In this sense features common to knowledge and faith can be established in the light of the basic categories of the theory of evolution, namely adaptation, selection and mutation (1984: 8f).
• Theissen therefore assum es a continuity betw een biological and cultural evolution (which leads to the analogies betw een them) but states: cultural evolution is not sim ply the continuation of biological evolution but a higher form of it. In both areas developm ent presupposes (i) the appearance of variation; (ii) a selection from the variants; and (iii) their preservation. The paradigm of evolution therefore reveals two phases of evolution, biological and cultural (i e science, art and religion), which are as such different forms of com ing to grips w ith reality. And it is precisely Th eissen 's consistent referring to an adaptation to reality that to me reveals his im plicit realist position.
• Theissen eventually proceeds and view s know ledge and faith as two different patterns of behaviour in cultural evolution (1984: 18ff) . For this the analogies betw een biological and cultural evolution are obviously very im portant:
-For Theissen every cultural innovation can be seen as a kind of 'm u tation ': w hile it takes over traditional elem ents by com bining them in a new way, it also creates som ething that has not been there before. This may be any new theory or innovative event in art or ethics, et cetera. Theissen thus uses the concept 'm utation' m etaphorically, leaving behind its literal reference to genetic changes. In cultural evolution, cultural innovations therefore per form the same function that m utations do in biological evolution by providing a choice of variants (Theissen 1984: 178) . These m utations, as cultural innovations, are therefore creative responses to a particular problem and can happen in language, w riting and im agery (Theissen 1984: 11). -Im plied in the m etaphor 'm utation' is that of 'selectio n ': Human beings select the m ost effective cultural patterns of behaviour by learning processes, that is by trial-and-error, im aginative learning and problem -solving (Theissen 1984: I lf ) . This process of cultural selection then leads to an adaptation to a reality 'w hich extends beyond h um anity' (Theissen 1984: 15). -In biological evolution, m utation and selection lead to a develop m ent towards increasingly differentiated organism s only if im provem ents w hich have once been achieved are not lost again, and are protected from chance deteriorations. In nature of course there are rem arkable processes which ensure the reduplication of forms of life (Theissen 1984: 15) . For Theissen it is obvious that cultural evolution works with analogous processes: It substitutes tradition for genetic transm ission, cultural identity for seperation, im prob able experiences (Theissen 1984: 15ff) . Tradition in this sense is therefore seen as the transference of non-genetic inform ation from one generation to the next.
C O N CLU D IN G STA TEM EN TS

O n critical realism in theology
Th eissen 's remark that 'the only reason for identifying oneself w ith a particular religious tradition is the conviction that it does in fact present an appropriate solution to religious problem s ' (1979: 77) is not only revealing but also very relevant for the problem of credibility in theological thought.
In an attem pt to interpret the epistem ological im plications of this statem ent for theological thought, I would like to claim that not T h eissen 's critical rationalist attempt at an evolutionary epistem ology but critical realism offers us what Theissen is rightly searching for, that is, a credible integration of knowledge and faith. I have also (already) tried to indicate that this position is in fact im plied in T heissen's arguments.
W hen Theissen (1984: 19) therefore states that knowledge should be seen as the adaptation of cognitive structures to reality, this is already an outspoken realist view point. And faith is not a structure w hich has becom e obsolete, but in fact struggles at the lim its of human conscious ness (Theissen 1984: 17) . As such faith can also be seen as an anticipa tion of future possibilities of evolution, w hich have not yet reached the level of our consciousness. W hile Theissen then proceeds and views knowledge and faith as two different patterns of behaviour in cultural evolution (1984: 18ff), I would add that not only scientific knowledge but indeed also theological reflection could be viewed as 'form s of adaptation' to reality. Both in science and theology our constructs and theories give us some provisional insight into the different dom ains of the reality of that w hich is being studied. In this sense the critical realist in theology is convinced that there is a 'fit' (McMullin 1984: 35; 1982: 32) , how ever provisional, betw een the structure of his theories and the structure of the reality he is groping for: an assurance that does not com e from a com parison betw een them -he has no independent access to this reality in terms of a naive realist correspondence theory -but an assurance that comes from the inner logic of the realist argumen itself. In this way the realist argument shows that our only access to the reality on which the scientist -and thus also the theologian -focus, is through the scientific concept. In this sense I could agree with Theissen that through scientific -and theological -knowledge are we enabled to have the 'experiences of resonance' which he so often discusses in both his books. Precisely through what we provisionally know can we have intim ations of a central reality w hich determ ines and conditions everything (Theissen 1984: 19) .
W hen therefore regarded from a much more credible epistem ological critical realist basis, Theissen (1984: 20) could indeed with good reasons state:
Thus evolutionary epistem ology confirm s a first basic experience of any religion, namely that behind the fam iliar hum an world a m ysterious other world opens up which appears only indirectly, brokenly and sym bolically in the world that we experience and interpret.
4.2 On the function of an ultim ate religious com m itm ent in theological reflection W hen Theissen (1984: 26) sees faith and knowledge as attem pts to understand the whole of life as a response to an ultimate reality, it becom es very obvious that his thought requires ar\ epistem ological model of rationality that would be able to accommodate an ultimate faith com m itm ent. W ithin the Popperian or critical rationalist paradigm this could never be possible, whereas critical realism in theology opens up a way to acknowledge the fundam ental role played by com m itm ent -both theoretical and ultimate religious com m itm ents -in scientific and theological reflection. T heissen's decision for Christian faith forms a consistent them e in his own thought, and statem ents like the following would indeed require a definite account-rendering of his own com m itm ent to C hristianity: But w hat is that m ysterious ultim ate reality towards which our organic, intellectual and religious structures develop attem pts at adaptation? Religious tradition knows only one appropriate term for it: God (1984: 25) . Compared w ith this nam e, all other terms like 'central reality' and 'ultim ate reality' are only counsels of desperation (1984: 30). Theissen (1984: 87) acknowledges that im ages of God from evolutionary theory m ight show us a way of overcom ing the herm eneutical conflict betw een New Testam ent Christology and modern consciousness. He also correctly states that the use of m etaphors leads us into the obscure interm ediate area betw een poetry and reality, and betw een creative im agination and reality. M etaphors therefore transcend boundaries w hich are set by strict reflection and are therefore indispensable for theological reflection (1984: 87) .
On the role of metaphors in theological reflection
This of course -as we saw earlier -is true of all scientific thought, and that is why the criterion of fertility is directly linked to the use of models and m etaphors in a critical realist paradigm (cf McM ullin 1984: 30ff) . This is also why it should be obvious that new m etaphors in theology should be creatively developed with material from the expe rience of our time.
The way in which m etaphors are thus linked to the very centre of scientific thought is of the utmost im portance, not only for understand ing scientific realism , but also for evaluating critical realism in theology. The direct im plication of this im portant fact is that the language of the scientist is not so direct and 'literal' as it was once thought to be. Not only are even the most literal-sounding terms 'theory-laden', but since they are always to a certain extent provisional, they must be regarded as m etaphoric (cf McMullin 1982: 37) . To regard certain concepts as m etaphorical is not to say that they are not precise, or that they are always am biguous. On the contrary, McMulhn (1982: 37) states it well: M etaphors are not normally am biguous, yet at crucial m om ents in the continuing developm ent of science, they do generate am biguity, ju st the sort of fruitful am biguity that perm its a theory to be extended, reshaped, rethought et cetera. Therefore:
The m etaphor is helping to illum inate som ething that is not well understood in advance, perhaps, some aspect of hum an life that we find genuinely puzzling or frightening or m ysterious. The m anner in which such m etaphors work is by tentative suggestion (McMullin 1984: 31) .
The role of m etaphor in scientific thought is also the scientific realist's answ er to K uhn's well-known thesis of the incom m ensurability b e tween paradigm s, and therefore often also betw een theories, in science.
As regards the problem of continuity when the scientist moves from a rejected theory to a new theory, what provides the continuity is the underlying m etaphor or m etaphors of successive theories. Thus one may find that in scientific thought one aspect of an original or older theory may eventually be dropped, w hile others are thought through again and creatively retained. Even in a total 'paradigm sw itch' it will be only the metaphor(s) that constitute the continuity. In our understanding of the world -also our scientific and theological understanding -metaphors therefore play a significant if not central role. In fact the explanatory power or success of a theory depends on the effective m etaphors it can call upon. For this reason I would call the epistem ological model that scientific realism offers us, a relational m odel. The scientist as su bject, the m etaphor-m aker (McMullin 1982: 37) is now recognized as an inseparable part of the scien tific en deavour. O f this McMullin (1982: 37) says:
Yet this in no way lessens the realism of science, the thrust of the scientist to grasp the 'irreducible X' before him. It is, indeed, precisely the quality of a scientific theory as fruitful m etaphor, as lending itself to further developm ent, that most com m ents it as good science.
For the critical realist the theoretical language of theological reflection is HTS 44/1 (1988) therefore theoretical explanation of a special sort. It is m etaphorical, and thus open-ended and ever capable of further development. The precise m etaphorical basis of all scientific language gives this language re sources of suggestion that are the most im m ediate testim ony of its ontological worth.
Against this background it should now be clear why scientific realism has developed into one of the m ost im portant positions in the current philosophy of science debate: It not only highlights the role of m eta phorical reference in scientific theory-form ation w hile honouring the provisionality and socio-historical nature of all knowledge, but it also enables us to retain the ideals of truth, objectivity, rationality and scientific progress in an exciting and re-interpreted way. It is therefore not at all surprising that the realist challenge has at present been taken on in the hum anities, especially the social sciences and also in theology. I am fully convinced that, because of the im portant relational analysis and the accom panying interpretative and thus herm eneutical dim en sion of all knowledge in the realist paradigm, this venture can in no valid way be seen as a return to the positivist ideal of the uniform ity of all scientific knowledge. On the contrary: it opens up creative and exciting p ossibilities -also and especially for theology. P retoria: UNISA.
